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Purpo s e
This investigation was undertaken with the primary desire
to ascertain, if possible, the underlying causes of industrial
disputes, by studying the actual cases which have occurred.
The problem presented many and varied difficulties, the princi-
ple obstacle was the lack of comprehensive data on strikes
and other industrial disorders.
The writer made extensive use of the Labor Library in the
Littauer School of Public Administration at Harvard University,
In collecting the information as to the causes and the methods
employed in settling industrial disputes, it was necessary to
read some 500 cases of industrial strife. Since this informa-
tion was widely scattered in magazine articles, newspaper
accounts, public documents of the United States Government,
and few books, it was decided to discuss only representative
cases in various categories of industry.
It was found after reading the causes of many disputes,
to classify the causes in the following mannert
1, Those disputes arising from a desire to force
management to recognize labor unions,
2, Those disputes arising from the desire for higher
wages,
3, Those disputes arising from racial discrimination,
4, Those disputes arising from disciplinary causes.
It would be impossible to recount and would serve no useful
purpose to deliniate case after case that contain similar
. l
.
’> J •
.
•j
'-r: 1..VD lXoo (u
.
to
•I ::‘i nl . \lt . .. • r C
ev!ch'J ne.'sj'i jlno BBi e±b
.
ijfrn'. 1c 1-
s isnnBni §
•'VIG'I 0.1 ‘llci. £ ‘'..C-'T - S.t'tB 1'j eBOXii . I
3 :-r-i;V. <5 3 I £'30 C G ' 1 OCfr 1 flO T 9T*. >' n.£.r<'V
,
.
causes. The methods and the findings were of primary importance
so that some pattern could he woven and comprehensive results
deduced. Another factor considered was the different classes
of industry and the experiences they have encountered in labor
disputes. The steel, coal, automobile and textile industries
were felt to be excellent cross sections of industrial America.
Cases were selected in these industries to show the causes and
the result of industrial warfare.
In choosing the outstanding cases of labor-management
disputes, the methods employed to bring them to a satisfactory
conclusion for all concerned, was given initial importance.
Arbitration appears to be an effective and practical means
of disposing of disputes as a substitute for wasteful interrup-
tions in production. There are indications that the number of
instances of arbitration and the significance oi» arbitrational
awards will continue to grow as rapidly for some time in the
future as they have in the immediate past. Court action, as a
rule, is too slow and too technical to offer a sufficiently
prompt or adaptable solution for labor disputes. Courts are
not always in session, and when they are, they are not equipped
with adequate tools and rules to enable them to solve many
controversies which daily arise in the fields of ethics and
general employer-employee relationships.
Hundreds of arbitrations of labor controversies have been
held in recent years. If those who have had experience with
a substantial number of these pool the results of their
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observations and studies, and by publication make them avail-
able for study and use by others, some measure of forward pro-
gress may result. Other arbitrators may turn to such work for
guidance and suggestion.

I Causes of Industrial Disputes.
Almost up to the beginning of the twentieth century, it
would have been regarded in America as an unwarranted inter-
ference in private affairs for the federal government to inter-
vene in aiding the establishment of wage rates, hours of labor,
and conditions under which the worker was forced to earn his
livlihood. However, three entirely separate and distinct
factors gave rise to government attempts at regulation of these
conditions. The first was the sweatshop evil; second, the
stoppage of work with injuries resulting to the public from
strikes and other forms of industrial conflicts; and the third
was the general economic depression which started in 1929.
Less than seventy- five years ago, when industry was small,
and the owner worked alongside the employee; there was a direct
contact between the employer and the workman. They knew each
other personally, and they were conscious of a mutual interest
in their relationship. It was necessary for the workman to
possess certain skills which established him as an individual
of some importance, not only with his employer, but with the
community as well. This self respect placed the worker on a
more equal level with the master craftsman who usually owned
the business. Theirs was a common language in which they dis-
cussed common interests, understanding and mutual respect
«
As the years went by, industry grew into corporate form
with the resulting separation between owner and workman. Into
being came great organizations in which transmission lines were
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formed connecting the top executives and the workman. Except
through the foreman, direct contact was no longer possible
between the top executive and his workman.
Ever changing conditions intensified competitive forces,
and the problem, "Survival of the Fittest", became the chief
concern of top management. Energies were directed almost
entirely toward the objectives of improved methods, better
materials, new products, greater markets, and the transfer
of skills from men to machines. Comparatively little thought
or study, and practically no research, were given to the question
of understanding human behavior. There was no time, nor did
it seem necessary, to develop better understanding and confi-
dence in dealing with the worker.
If the worker protested conditions, his voice was very
seldom heard beyond the ears of his immediate superiors. The
foreman's word was the last, and in many instances, he did not
consider the workman's complaint seriously. Grievances, which
were of great importance in the worker's mind, were frequently
made light of by the foreman. There was nothing for the work-
man to do but "take it or leave it". If he went over the
foreman's head on any matter which the foreman had not handled
to the worker's satisfaction, it was certain to end in a sep-
aration from the job. The foreman was in reality the company
to the workman. He was the judge and jury who dealt out
decisions arbitrarily, and who in many cases, did not even
bother to get the facts. Unjust decisions were handed out at
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times in order to cover inefficiencies on the foreman's part,
a. Struggle for Unionization,
When, on occasion, a worker expressed a desire to join up
with his fellow workmen so that their voices could be heard,
immediate steps were taken to break up such contemplated pro-
cedure on the workman's part. To make sure that no such
organization took place, great associations were formed to
fight unionism in any and all of its forms. The divine right
of the employer to deal the cards with a take-it-or-leave-it
attitude had to be protected at any cost.
Thus the workman began to doubt and to wonder that his best
interest lay in the same direction as those of the company.
He watched the growth of associations to prevent him from
organizing. He became aware of the espionage systems in
operation to spy on him. His earnings were figured according
to complicated systems which he was unable to understand. The
workman realized his inability to cope with mechanization and
relocation of industry. New machines appeared to take away
his job, and he was faced'with the necessity of finding a new
job, frequently under conditions which caused him to wonder if
all the effort, interest and skill he had exerted were really
worth while. He was aware that favoritism and family relation-
ship were the bases for promotion instead of ability and
increased endeavor.
Slowly but surely out of the depths of his despair, he
reached the conclusion that something must be done if his voice
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8was to be heard. Thus industry through its own shortcomings
gave the impetus to the formation of the mighty trade unions
the world has seen rise to a dominant place in the industrial
life of the world.
United Mine Workers of Colorado.
Labor from its infancy has contended, that the worker has
a moral right to a just share of the wealth he creates. This
share should be in the form of compensation for his skill,
devotion and honesty. To test this contention for higher
wages, there was organized in 1900 the first local of the
United Mine Workers of Colorado. The following year a district
organization was formed with fifteen locals, only to be elimin-
ated early in its existence by "employer-inspired official
violence." However, the United Mine Workers continued secret
organization activities, and in 1903 a revived district organ-
ization came out into the open with a public letter to the
Governor of Colorado in which a list of the coal miner* s griev-
ances was recited. This action developed into a year long
strike, 1903-1904 in the Trinidad district against the Colorado
Iron and Fuel Co., a Rockefeller concern. Strife developed
and as a result, the Coal Miner's organization collapsed in
the struggle.
In 1910 the United Mine Workers again approached the
Colorado Coal fields and called a strike April 1st, and again
they failed. The organization continued to function and in
1913, another strike was called and this venture was successful.
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The demands of the union consisted of the following:
(1) Recognition of the union
(2) A 10$ increase in wages
(3) An eight hour day for all labor
(4) The right to trade in any store they wanted and to
choose their boarding house and doctor
The Unionists were insistent upon the establishment of a policy
of recognition of the union closed shop and a written agreement
specifying the terms of employment and providing for the adjust-
ment of grievances. These demands were refused and no attempt
was made to avert the strike, set for the 23rd of September,
not even to the extent of granting the union a conference with
the mine owners. The companies affected provided subsistence
for 30,000 people, most of them Greek, Slavs, Italians and
Mexicans. With the refusal even to confer regarding the demands
there ensued a struggle, which for bitterness and violence, has
few equals in the entire history of industrial relations.
Nine thousand miners answered the strike call on the twenty-
third and marched with their possessions and families out of
the company camps to establish tent colonies on land adjacent
or near the mining properties.
The company immediately imported strike-breakers and a
period of savage brutality followed. Conditions became so
difficult in a short time, the company requested the Governor
of Colorado to send the National Guard to protect the mining
property. The troops arrived on the 26th of October and
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occupied a front of some 120 miles. There were early attempts
on the part of the militia to be impartial, but by November,
they were intimidating the strikers and defending the strike
breakers at all times. At the Governor’s request the Colorado
Federation of Labor investigated the charges against the
militia. These were found to be so serious the committee
appealed to United States Senators and Representatives to bring
about a federal investigation. One of the most serious and
tragic violences perpetrated was the Ludlow Massacre of April
20th. Men, women and children were killed and violated in
every possible manner by the troops. It was alleged at the
time that the company had men dressed as soldiers, and they
committed some of the most heinous crimes. This massacre
caused the strikers to avenge themselves and the Governor was
forced to appeal to President Wilson to send federal troops
because state forces were inadequate to keep order. This act
brought the strike to the attention of the whole country.
Congressman Foster, chairman of the House Committee on
mining, appealed to John D. Rockefeller, Jr. a principal stock
holder in the Colorado Fuel and Iron Co. to intervene, but
Rockefeller refused. Secretary of War Garrison called upon
all strikers, mine guards and neutrals in the strike zone to
surrender their arms to the federal troops. The federal
commander prohibited the importation of strike breakers and
Wilson attempted mediation. This mediation consisted of a three
year truce, which provided for the enforcement of the mining
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laws of the state, re-employment of striking miners not found
guilty of violations of the law; a guarantee of non-intimidation
of the workers either by the -union or the mining companies, the
posting of a current wage scale. This mediation measure was
accepted by the workers but refused and rejected by the mine
operators. The strikers sent a committee of three workers to
meet with the President of the United States to bring about a
termination of the strike on December 10, 1913.
In the meantime John D. Rockefeller, Jr. had been corres-
ponding with W.L. MacKenzie King, formerly Minister of Labor
in Canada, and author of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1907.
Mr. Rockefeller asked Mr. King for some advice on "organization
in the mining camps which will assure to the employees the
opportunities of unionization."
Mr. Rockefeller believed the loss of personal relationship
between management and the men to be the most important problem
in industrial relations, and he submitted a plan which subse-
quently was to go far in an effort to restore this personal
relationship.
Both Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. King believed that the lack of
personal relationship between directing management and the
employees was the origin of the bitter conflict in the coal
strike in Colorado. Mr. Rockefeller’s plan was a principle of
representation. The idea was to apply in industry the mechanism
of republican government in political life.
The Colorado mine workers finally achieved all of their aims
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and the union and union membership was accepted by the operators.
b. Wages of Labor
Many economists have long enunciated the principle that
labor has a just and equitable claim against the wealth it
produces. The long struggle for recognition of this right has
been the cause of countless industrial disputes. The coming
of the Industrial Revolution, which first manifested itself in
the factory system in England, and later in all the other
manufacturing countries of the world, give the worker a
reasonable argument for higher wages for his time, skill and
effort. Increased production because of technological improve-
ments resulted in large profits to the factory owners and huge
dividends to the investors. The workers received just enough
to keep body and soul together. The union leaders advanced a
basic premise "because of huge profits, industry can afford to
pay higher wages."
While the struggle for unionization is a means, wages as
a cause of strikes, is the end in itself. The important thing
to the individual laborer is the amount of money he receives.
His whole purpose in unionization and in striking is to get
high wages, while the interest of the employer is to pay low
wages and receive high profits.
The question of wages and how they are regulated is inter-
esting but difficult to answer definitely. Economists have
made their contribution and whether or not we accept them, we
must consider them in any discussion of wages.
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Iron Law of Wages.
In the early part of the nineteenth century , Ricar-
do and iualthus gave us the earliest interpretations of the theo
ry known as the ’’Iron Law ” of wages. They based their argument
on the theory that the wages of labor always tend toward the min-
imum of subsistence necessary for the laborer's family. Thus the
wage below the amount necessary for subsistence tends to increase
the death rate and decrease the birth rate and results in a scar-
city of labor . Industry , in order to survive, is forced to increase
wages gradually. As wages rise, the birth rate increases and the
death rate falls, until there is again an excess of labor, which
is reduced through the "niggardliness of nature”and the cycle isi
completed. Such fatalism could not be accepted for long and gave
way to another interpretation, that of the Wage Fund Theory.
Wage Fund Theory.
The Wage Fund Theory was accepted by the greatest
thinkers of the middle period of the nineteenth century .JohnStu-
art Mill, prolific and expressive writer, stated: "Wages not only
depend upon the relative amount of capital and population, but
cannot under the rule of competition be affected by anything
else.Wages cannot rise but by increase in the aggregate funds
employed in hiring laborers or a diminuation of the funds.
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Productivity Theory
This theory covers the entire field of distribu-
tion in economics • Here the principles of diminishing returns and
marginal or final utility are brought into play.
John Bates Clark, whose name is associated with
this theory as its sponsor , says , "The law of wages would stand thus
1.3y common mercantile rule, all men of a given
degree of ability must take what the marginal
men of the same ability get. This principle
fixes the market rate of wages.
2 .Marginal men get what they produce. This prin-
ciple governs wages more remotely by fixing a
natural standard for them.
3. Each unit of labor is worth to its employer
what the last unit produces, as real as gravity
is the force which draws the actual pay of men I
toward a standard which is set by the final pro-
ductivity law. n
These theories gave no satisfaction. The first one pro-
mises the worker salvation, the second assures him he will get
little because of wider distribution of wages, and the third re-
veals to the worker that if the population increases thus
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throwing more men into his particular field of endeavor, the
marginal product will be less and his wages will be necessarily
less. This has led thinkers to try to overcome the situation
by establishing a new basis for wage adjustment. Almost with-
out exception the all-important question arises-—what is a
living wage and how are men to obtain it? Tied into all labor
disputes is the problem of wages.
Since 1890, almost 80$ of the industrial disputes in the
United States have been brought about because of wage demands.
The strike has been the universal medium that the workers have
employed to gain their ends. A strike is variously defined as
a simultaneous cessation of work, or as a combined action by
the workers either to compel their employer to accede to their
demands or to oppose the demands of the employer himself. The
fundamental thing in any definition of a strike ought to be
the emphasis of the fact that it is quite difference from mere
stoppage or quitting of work by the individual employee. It
has been the habit of the courts of law to couple strikes with
the individual’s right to leave his work. The strike is a
collective move to quit work but not to quit definitely. The
purpose in the back of the minds of the strikers is not to
leave one’s employer to go to another but to compet the same
employer to accede to their demands, with the intention of
keeping their same job.
In September, 1936, the Carnegie- Illinois Steel Corporation,
principal subsidiary of the United States Steel Corporation, in
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response to employees' request for higher wages. Issued a formal
statement to its workers giving the reasons why the company
considered itself unable to grant further increases at that time
The Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation had been formed in
1935 by the consolidation of the operating facilities of the
two predecessor subsidiaries, the Carnegie and the Illinois
concerns. The new company at that time had an annual capacity
of 20,460,900 tons of steel ingots or castings, equal to 74.83%
of the total of 27,341,900 tons for the entire United States
Steel Corporation, and equivalent to 29.72% of the entire
industry's capacity of 68,849,717 tons. This capacity greatly
exceeded the 9,360,000 tons of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation,
second largest producer, and the 6,129,000 tons of the third
largest, the Republic Steel Corporation. In 1936, the proper-
ties and the activities of another United States Steel subsid-
iary, the American Tin Plate Company, were merged with those
of the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation.
The merger of the Carnegie and the Illinois had been under-
taken in order to acquire greater corporate simplicity and to
eliminate some overlapping of sales organization and duplication
of production personnel. The new corporation had manufacturing
and selling facilities for every important steel product from
the lightest to the heaviest.
The labor policies of the United States Steel Corporation
had been criticized for many years by labor leaders. After
passage in 1933 of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
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employee representatives plan, sometimes referred to as
"company unions," were established in most of the plants of
the Corporation* These plans provided for the election, by the
employees, of representatives authorized under the arrangements
to participate in joint committees .with representatives of the
managements in the consideration of disputes.
The labor situation in the steel industry became the subject
of further concern to the steel companies in the spring of
1936, when John L. Lewis, having broken with the American Fed-
eration of Labor, formed the committee for Industrial Organiza-
tion and announced his intention of organizing the steel
industry for the first time in its history.
The hourly wage rate for basic common labor in the steel
industry. Including the United States Steel Corporation, had
remained unchanged, at 44 cents an hour, from August, 1923
to October 1,1931, when it was reduced 10^ to 39.6 cents. In
May, 1932 there was a cut of 15% to 33.7 cents. The rate was
increased by the Corporation to 40 cents in July, 1933 when the
NRA code was pending.
In September, 1936, there was an adjustment which affected
only the 10 hour schedule of the common laborers, who were
placed on an eight hour schedule and given an hourly raise of
2i cents an hour. The remainder of the employees received no
increase.
At the same time, 36 employee representatives from 12 sheet
and tin plate plants of the Corporation met in Pittsburgh for
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their annual convention* After four days of secret discussions,
they demanded a minimum daily wage of $5*00 for unskilled labor*
Among other things, the group asked the Corporation to establish
a pension plan and seniority rights, to grant vacations with
pay, to abolish all incentive pay rates in the sheet and tin
plate mills, and to designate every other Friday as pay day*
During the autumn of 1936, employee representatives
reiterated their contention that the company could afford to
pay higher wages, and renewed the demand for increases* By the
middle of October, the company recognized for bargaining pur-
poses a committee of 18 employees, known as the General Council
of Employees* Representatives. This council comprised two
members from each of the nine of the Corporation’s eighteen
plants*
T he Council proposed that outside arbitrators be called
in to determine the company’s ability to pay higher wages. The
company refused to submit the problem to outside arbitration,
on the grounds that such a procedure would give outsiders
control in the dispute, and that the company’s books would be
thrown open to the public and competitors during the arbitration
proceedings, and that this step would wreck the objective of
the employee’s representation plan, which was that the company
and the employees should settle their own problems without
outside advice.
On October 28, the company refused a request by the employees
for an increase of $1*12 a day for all employees, but agreed
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to negotiate for a compromise •Immediately following this nego-
tiation, the uarnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation announced an
additional increase of ^3 to $8 a ton on the nroducts of their
mills
.
When the workers became aware of the increase in the
price of the products they were producing, they immediately re-
newed theur request for higher wages , stating as their basic pre^
mise,the cost of living had risen and it was necessary for them
to receive higher wages in order to provide for themselves and
their families. As a result of this attack, the Carnegie-Illinois
Steel Corporation signed an agreement on March 16, 1936, which
granted a substantial increase to all categories of workers in
their employ.
c. Hours of Labor
There have been Ion'! and laborious agitation for
shorter hours in all branches of industry. For two generations
the steel industry had been notorious for its long hours of
work, excessive heat from the ovens, and in general all round bad
working conditions . Of all these conditions , the long hours of togl
was the chief complaint of t}ae workers. The twelve hour day, sev-
en day week schedule had done more to undermine the health and
general well being of the workers than any other single factor.
The employees wanted time away from the furnaces in order to
enjoy the companionship of their wives and children. This desire
could hardly be called unjust. The incident of accidents in the
steel industry was hia;h and medical authorities pointed an ac-
at the long hours the men were compilled to work*
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The coal, rail and steel industry together with the textile
industry, have a sorry record for the long and arduous hours
the workers were compelled to toil* Until as late as 1925,
the twelve hour day was the usual program in most industries*
The Railroad Brotherhood was the first organization to take
effective action in a program to reduce the hours of work*
Medical research into the cause of accidents in the five major
industries, pointed out that excessive fatigue, brought on by
long hours of work, was the major cause for 79% of industrial
accidents* It was noted that the longer the employee was
required to toil, the less active his reflexes. Hence he was
more susceptible to injury. Another important finding was made
in respect to the recovery of men injured* It was discovered
that the period of complete recovery was considerably longer
for an industrial worker than any other patient with a similar
injury* This led doctors to believe that a great reduction in
strength and recuperative powers had been lessened by long
hours of employment.
Early in the serious unemployment period, the American
labor interests strongly advocated hours limitation by law.
The hope was that this would be a means of spreading work
among a larger number of workers*
The Pair Labor Standards ,Act went into effect in October
of 1938* It was estimated that some 11,000,000 employees were
covered by its provisions, and that 1,500,000 would benefit by
the shorter hours, and 750,000 would benefit by pay increases.
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The working week of those covered by the Act was immediately
shortened to forty-four hours and eventually to forty*
What this law actually does is to establish a floor for
wages and a ceiling for hours, the standards to be the same
throughout the United States.
Under this legislation it will be impossible for industries
to move across state boundaries and with cheap labor and long
hours to set up unfair competition. A factory in one state
with a good labor law will not have to face a factory in another
state with bad labor laws, which permits industry to overwork
and underpay its employees and thereby sell for less.
In time the result should be more settled conditions and
less irritation on the part of both industry and labor. It
ought to mean more money to spend and more efficient work. If
an employer must pay overtime for more than forty-four hours
of work a week, he will get in extra workers, which in turn
ought to lessen the burden of unemployment. On the other hand,
considering the long range economic effects of the law, the
question must be raised as to whether or not it will result
in displacement of low-paid workers by machinery. Such workers
are now doing by hand what a machine might accomplish more
cheaply and perhaps more efficiently.
Another question pushed to the fore by the Act is its
effect on the tendency toward decentralization of. industry.
Will higher wages and shorter hours force out of business the
marginal producer in various fields V No sooner had the law
-.
.
S.1 '.•«>« otcl* « ewcX 'Iodj
.
1
C c. Mol n . - - a ^ '
.v': OX '
.
del ' ooo iiX’.Xra trioam s tfsrfw r I
.
.
•
•
.
.
. c .. t . -UOi".:.V I O'. ; X
been put in to effect than a number of pecan-shelling firms,
which had been paying ten to fifteen cents an hour, shut down.
The tobacco industry was reported to have laid off thousands
of workers rather than raise their wages to twenty-five cents
an hour. Telegraph companies and many other industries did
likewise.
The wage and hour law has brought into consideration many
social and economic implications, and the answer to these
questions must await further experience.
d. Conditions of Employment.
Prom the foregoing remarks it has been pointed out that
the desire for union recognition, increase in wages and
reduction of hours, have in general constituted the major
issues in industrial disputes. However, another condition
has given rise to many turbulent reactions by workers.
The conditions of employment is a subject that has caused
management to revamp its industrial policy and expend large
sums of money in order to correct some flagrant abuses.
In the chemical industry, it has been necessary for the
factory owners to install costly equipment in order that some
of the hazards of this type of employment might be reduced.
In the manufacture of strong acids, it was the custom in a
previous era, to compel the workers to supply their protection
in the form of proper clothing, boots and rubber gloves.
Since there was a small demand for these products, their cost
was high and the workers were forced to purchase them or run
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the risk of being injured, if they worked without them. The
cost was in reality a reduction in pay, since the worker had
to make the purchase out of his own pocket. Through union
action, management in the chemical industry has been forced
to correct such conditions and to supply the workers with the
proper equipment in order to insure the maximum of personal
safety#
In the steel and coal industry, the hazards of employment
have long been noted. The manner in which safety precautions
by management have been neglected, has caused the countless
loss of life in mine disasters. In the recent coal strike
one of the major issues of the union was the strict enforcement
of all federal and state regulations concerning mine safety.
In the steel industry, the exposure to extreme high tem-
perature has been the cause of loss of health to many workers#
Recently all steel corporations have agreed to shorten the
period of exposure and all workers who toil at or near the
furnaces will be given relief at no loss of pay.
The elementary conveniences of life such as pure drinking
water and sanitary toilet facilities are only recent innovations
in most industries#
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II Methods of Handling Disputes
s
a. By Unions,
When an industrial dispute arose in a factory that was
under union organization, if management refused to acceed to
the demands of the workers a strike was called and the plant
was forced to close or resort to the employment of strike-
breakers,
b. By Management,
Historically, when a difference between a manufacturer and
his employees reached a point where a strike was decLared,
the operator had one of three choices: 1, he may capitulate
to the strikers, 2, he may determine the breakage of the strike,
3,' he may negotiate with them and attempt a compromise. If
and when he chooses the last course, he may advertise for new
employees who are willing to work on the terms rejected by the
strikers. On the other hand he may, and often does, telegraph
to a strike-breaking agency. If the representatives of these
agencies are not already on the scene, they immediately take
the fastest transportation that will get them there and proceed
to talk business, just as any other commercial salesman would.
When terms are finally reached, the strike-breaking agency
begins its work.
The history of strike-breaking is not an attractive one,
it has been, and still is, often bloody and murderous. Its
employees are often an army of thugs and mercenaries. They
are apt to have no legal responsibility and are therefore
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unscrupulous in the use of technique. Too, it is often a
profitable business, and the profit has been an aid to this
particular brand of justice. It is also interesting to note
that this strike-breaking industry which thrives on legitimate
industrial disputes exists in no other country in the world
except the United States. Why it exists here and why it has
never been thoroughly exposed by our courts, remains one of
the industrial mysteries of our times.
The first strike-breaking agency in this country was set
up by Allen Pinkerton in the seventies. This agency supplied
guards for ”life and property” not men to take the place of
the strikers. The first to organize armies for shipment over
the nation wherever men quit their work for better pay or
shorter hours was Jack Whitehead. He operated from about 1385
to 1890. One Jim Parley was his successor. Under Farley’s
guidance, the profession acquired a halo which the various
branches of strike breakers have since attempted to maintain.
Parley was said to have been a brave and generous man, he took
only men who were trained mechanics, each an expert in his job.
The myth continues with the notion that Parley never broke a
strike in which the employees on strike were paid less than
two dollars a day. Mr. Parley apparently wished to convince
labor that there were depths to which he would not sink.
>
Parley’s last strike-breaking job was in San Francisco in
1907, when 12 men were killed and 252 wounded as a result of
the strike-breaking siffge. After this battle the Parley men
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worked under the Bergoff agency. Bergoff took a page from the
book of industry and specialized in three principal departments:
1, undercover department, 2, open shop department, to keep the
wheels of industry moving, 3, protection department, for the
protection of life and property. Other agencies have special-
ized also, for example. Burns and Pinkerton men excelled in
industrial espionage, Baldwin-Felts men worked more in the
special coal mines of West Virginia and Colorado. When it came
to recruiting large numbers of men for strike-breaking, Bergoff
was usually the first agency called.
Strike-breaking has been a costly business for industry.
Besides the high prices paid to the agency, strike-breakers
usually steal or destroy every thing on which they can lay
their hands. They have been known to steal plumbing fixtures,
expensive furs and each other’s old clothes. A strike breaker
is usually paid $12 to $15 a day and what he can steal. During
street car strikes, strike-breakers consider it legitimate to
take the fares, and when one railroad company issued ” slugs"
the strike-breakers went on strike until they were permitted
to collect the money. Bergoff claims that a car barn with
500 strike-breakers in it is worth from $3500 to $5000 a day.
From 1914 to 1924 Bergoff collected $10,000,000 for his strike-
breaking activities.
The business of strike-breaking is still with us. Standard
Oil of New York in 1921 paid Bergoff $175,000 for two weeks
work. In 1934 Bergoff sent his men to Milwaukee but Mayor Hoan
mtoriQ-
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immediately had most of them arrested. In 1935 his men were
sent to Georgia, but the Governor had them deported.
Though the field of professional strike-breaking is at
this time narrowed by company unions, by racketeers and by
private espionage systems such as those maintained by the auto-
mobile industry and the United States Steel Corporation
there is not a large city in the country where private detective
agencies will not be glad to furnish informers, strike-breakers
and guards. About 50% of the licensed detective agencies in
New York solicit strike-breaking work.
Many authorities contend at this time that had industry
been as solicitous of labor as it has been of strike-breakers,
the Committee of Industrial Organization would never have come
into being. The C.I.O. is largely a revolt against company
unions that have not only been tolerated but encouraged by the
American Federation of Labor. These company unions many times
have but little short of organized racketeers, working for
industry. The rapid success of the C.I.O. in organizing the
mass production industries can be attributed to the conscious
recognition on the part of labor of the need for the right to
maintain their own labor organization for the purposes of bar-
gaining and of settling labor disputes generally. Whether the
movement is permanent or temporary only the future can answer.
At any rate the C.I.O. has achieved astonishing results in its
short existence and appears now to be digging in to consolidate
its hard won gains. It is certainly a force to be reckoned with
el
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in the economic and political life of both industry and labor*
Boards of arbitration and mediation with the sanction of
law would not only make organized strike-breakers impossible
but would make them unnecessary* The machinery and the tactics
of the two are different* Strike-breakers employed by capital,
when a real issue is at stake, never settle the trouble*
The laws creating labor relation boards seek to assure to
labor the right to free organization, and to write into public
policy the theory that industrial peace Can be achieved most
lastingly if there is a balance of power between labor and
industry* The history of labor disputes has demonstrated
that a great preponderance of industrial power on one side or
the other has never made for long-time stability, except on
the basis of exploitation and coercion* This same history
also indicates that collectively established principles are
the most successful in industries where both labor and capital
have been effectively organized* If, therefore, the present
drive by federal and state governments to create laws permitting
labor to organize results in equalizing the status of workers
and their employees it will have unquestionably established
machinery and a technique of industrial peace*
It does seem strange that in the field of interstate
commerce, over which the federal government has jurisdiction,
should have been without systematic labor adjustment machinery,
to prevent interruption of service until as late as the
Wagner Act* This seems all the more incredible when it has as
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an example in the limited transportation field an effective
system of conciliation, mediation, arbitration, investigation
and adjudication, developed by Congress over a half century of
experience. Losses in wages, employment, destruction and
business mounts to hundred of millions of dollars; hatred and
class feeling are developed; while in the railroad industry a
high degree of peace has been maintained since the adoption of
the Railroad Labor Act of 1926,
The history of industrial strife is filled with industrial
tragedies that could have been avoided, if the disputents had
been provided with a legal program of procedure. Legislation
and experience show also that the government has barely opened
up this vast problem of national labor relations.
The federal government had lately reentered the field of
labor and industrial disputes and will play in it no secondary
role. Its interest is bound to be more recognized by increas-
ingly large numbers, not however as its own interest, but as a
group of interest most vital to the general welfare. The gov-
ernment must play a detached role and guard against excessive
claims made by labor due to its shifting economic power. That
labor has been sorely dealt with in the past cannot be denied.
That it has a just cause for grievance but few informed people
will question. Labor should and will claim a considerable
influence, proportioned to its importance and to its capacity
to participate, but in any event its role must remain subordin-
ate to the general welfare. Federal and state governments should
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be In a better position to determine and to protect the general
welfare than either labor or industry which are involved in
their own economic warfare and self-interest*
Whether or not national labor legislation Is sponsored by
political parties, it cannot but exfercise a great Influence
upon politics. The connection between the political program
of the state or national administration and the material well
being of the general public is to intimate to leave the workers
indifferent toward national politics. More and more, labor in
state and national conventions, and through its federations
and unions, will formulate resolutions of criticism or of
approval; and political programs will be drawn up with an eye
to meeting these demands. Industry if it runs true to form,
will follow the same procedure in an effort to meet and offset
the gains of labor. No better example of this is needed than
the American Liberty League versus the C.I.O. in the last
presidential campaign*
Labor is not only finding fault and agitating, but it is at
work studying modern economic problems with great care. It is
desirous of proving itself worthy of participation in the man-
agement of industry and the control of capital. Most labor
f
leaders today realize that there is no resemblance whatever
between a political revolution and an economic one, and they
have come to see the later as a stupendous delusion.
More than ever labor is conscious of its power, and
more than ever Its true leaders are cautious against its use.
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The dictates of human experience, and the none too sane
judgement of some of its organizers, makes labor conscious of
its oppressed state and the hopelessness of its previous
programs. It is to be hoped that employers, employees and the
government will not miss this opportunity to work out a uniform
government-labor-industry policy.
Whatever criticism may be made of these plans, opponents
should not forget that there are two very distinct philosophies
in American industrial labor relations: the old idea of
employer- employee relationship, and the idea of a nationally
supervised policy as embodied in the National Labor Relations
Act.
The national idea brings out the urgent need of widening
governmental interests, by bringing together representatives,
employers, employees, experts and humanitarians, and it will
affort greater protection, fuller justice, a larger and more
abundant life for the worker, without crippling production and
hampering the employer in his legitimate efforts toward the
increase in the national and personal wealth. Employer and
employee must realize that industrial peace is not .only possible
but practicable, and it must be sought with concerted purpose.
It is now an economic commonplace that the successful regulation
of labor must become national.
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Ill Settlement of Disputes*
a* By Arbitration*
In many parts of the world, early records show as almost
the beginning of law a tendency to discard tribal warfare, the
blood feud and other forms of violence for something in the
nature of arbitration* The settlement of disputes in accordance
with an ordeal or by appealing to the judgement of more or less
impartial third person appears to be an idea which in the nature
of things would antedate a true and mature leg$l system. There
is, perhaps, a deep underlying instinct which through the cen-
turies has caused men at the first step away from the settlement
of disputes through violence to prefer voluntary arbitration
rather than submission to authority* This is because violence
is likely to spread so as to involve many who originally had
no interest in the dispute and perhaps to engulf them and their
security in the conflict*
When one attempts to comment on the history of arbitration,
he is commenting on a feature of society which antedates the
establishment of a legal order and antedates written history
itself*
Arbitration, while long associated with the settlement of
labor disputes, has come recently into a distinctly new promin-
ence in the volume of its use in that field* Almost all types
of controversies and all subjects of collective bargaining
are increasingly entrusted to the process of arbitration. Many
unions and employers who, a few months ago were adamant against
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submission to arbitration, now accept that step as not only as
suitable and final in the settlement of grievances, but also
available as an aid to the completion of collectively bargained
labor contracts in almost all details. It may be confidently
assumed that if high integrity, understanding and strict
impartiality, coupled with adequate knowledge of labor laws
and economics, characterize the actions of the great majority
of the persons selected to act as arbitrators during the next
few critical years, the resulting confidence that interested
parties will repose in the arbitrational process may, in the
not too distant future, eliminate the waste and bitterness
incident to strikes, lockouts and any similar pressure steps
which in the past have affected dealings between organizations
of employers and employees.
There can be little doubt that the recently achieved impor-
tance of arbitration must be in part ascribed to war conditions
which, for practical purposes originated in 1940, The "no
strike-no lock-out pledge," which had as its purpose the
furnishing of a foundation for virtually universal arbitration
^by the National War Labor Board, Collective bargaining thus
took a long step forward. Demands of employees and refusals
of employers were no longer buttressed upon strikes and lock-
outs in which economic brute force would be likely to prevail
irrespective of fairness and logic. With economic warfare
foresworn, parties unable to agree turned naturally to the step
of seeking a decision upon the subject in dispute from impartial
r.£ .*! :>o£ won tn<
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and adequately informed third persons. In short, imposition
of arbitrary demands or refusals by means of expensive and
wasteful exchange of economic blows and losses gave way to
logical solutions of a relatively inexpensive and orderly
character.
A description and definition of the terms used in the pro-
cess of arbitration is important to note.
Arbitration may be said to be the hearing and the deter-
mination of a cause between parties in a controversy by person
or persons chosen by the parties, or appointed under statutory
authority, instead of by a judicial tribunal as ordinarily
provided by law.
The agreement to submit an existing dispute to arbitration
is usually known as a ” submission." By this contract the
Parties undertake to submit to and be bound by the award of one,
two or more arbitrators in relation to the matter which may be
in dispute between them.
The decision of an arbitrator is commonly called an ’’award."
The term decision however, is not uncommonly used to refer to
the entire document in which an arbitrator or a group of arbi-
trators summarize, weigh and discuss the evidence and the
applicable laws as they progress toward the award.
The term ’’umpire” is sometimes used to designate a presiding
arbitrator or an arbitrator selected by the other arbitrators
who have been appointed by the parties in the dispute. It is
supposed that the umpire will bring to the deliberations of the
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board an impartiality and a detachment of view somewhat greater
than that which may be found to characterize the treatment of
the subject in dispute by an arbitrator directly appointed by
one of the disputants. More correctly it should designate a
person selected to make a sole decision despite non-occurrence
of others acting as co-arbitrators. In somewhat frequent
instances the designation umpire is used to refer to a semi-
permanently selected arbitrator who, by mutual advance appoint-
ment by the parties, is available to be called in to make
awards upon any disputed matter which they, themselves, may
be unable to solve during the life of the agreement.
Layne & Bowler Case.
Layne and Bowler, Inc; is probably the largest manufacturer
of pumps in the country. In its plant in Memphis it manufacture
the pumps, pie, screens, etc. for water supply systems all
over the world. It has fourteen affiliated companies in this
country and in Canada, and five in Europe, Asia and South
America. The affiliated companies take orders and contracts
for installations, and place the orders for manufacture with
the company in Memphis.
Prior to 1941, The C.I.O. had no representation in the
Company’s plant in Memphis, at least as far as the records
show. Three American Federation of Labor Unions were repres-
ented; the Moulders Union, Machinists and the Pattern Makers.
The Moulders had been organized in the foundry for a good many
years and the Company had recognized and dealt with them.
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though there was no formal contract until October, 1940*
Prior to 1934, the Moulders had been strictly a craft
union, restricting its membership to moulders and apprentices.
At their Chicago convention in that year they amended their
constitution to read, "This union shall have jurisdiction over
all workers engaged in the production, processing and assembling
of castings and related products,"
By the addition of this amendment the Union became an
industrial union. It is a matter of common knowledge that it
takes into its membership all production employees in and around
a foundry, without distinction as to race or color. However,
the Local Wo, 66 never enlarged its membership to take in all
those men who became eligible under the amendment.
Until 1940 the Moulders Union never had an International
representative in Memphis, In September of that year, Mr. F.E,
Long, field representative of the International, visited
Memphis and attended a meeting of Local 66, He explained the
new amendment to the constitution and urged the Local to take
in all men eligible.
On October 30, 1940 Articles of Agreement were entered into
by the Company and the Moulders Union. By the terms of this
agreement the Company recognized and agreed to bargain with the
Moulders and Foundry Workers Union as the exclusive representa-
tive of all employees engaged in the production of castings for
the purpose of collective bargaining. At the time this contract
was executed the membership of the Moulders Union included only
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those working in the foundry itself, A group of twenty old
negro workers in the store room, shipping department, pit and
screen shop and Machine shop, although clearly production
workers eligible for membership under the Moulders constitution,
had never been taken in. The Moulders Union had never bargained
for these men prior to the contract, and if in negotiating the
contract the union intended to bargain for them, there is no
evidence to that effect. Neither party to the contract did
anything to indicate that the contract covered these men. The
Company did not notify them that under the Union Shop clause
they must join the union. The union did not notify them to
that effect, and made no demands that the minimum wage provision
be applied to them.
In view of the fact that Mr. Long testified that he had
explained the membership clauses of the contract at a meeting
of Local 66 and urged and instructed the Local to sign up all
eligible men, the above stated facts are amazing. They become
more so in the light of uncontradicted testimony that an in-
formally selected committee of the group in question began as
early as January, 1941, to inquire of their fellow employees
as to what union they could join. They approached a member of
the Machinist's Union, because a majority of them worked in
the machine shop. They were told that they were not eligible
for membership in that union. Two of the negroes testified
that they inquired of members in the Moulders Union if they
were eligible and were informed that they were not. The
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situation continued until August, 1941*
During the last days of July and early part of August,
an organizer for the S.W.O.C. was in Memphis and admitted to
membership one of the negroes. This immediately became known,
and an organizer of the Hod Carriers, an A.P.L. Union came
to the plant and attempted to recruit members, but without
success. Still the Moulders Union made no claims.
Without any demands having been made, and without warning
or notice of any kind to the Company, the Moulders Union,
assisted by the Machinists, locked the gates on the morning
of September 16, 1941 and prevented the group in question from
going to work. There is no evidence to connect the Company
with this unlawful act of the Moulders Union. The president
of the Company protested vigorously against the lockout and
tried to persuade the Moulders to unlock the gates and admit
the men to work. His appeals were of no avail. The next day
the Union agreed to unlock the gates and allow the men to re-
turn to work. Accordingly the gates were unlocked the next
day, but the men fearing trouble, stayed out.
The next day the Union sent a letter to the president of
the company and asserted that the negroes forming the group in
*
question, came under the jurisdiction of the Moulders Union
and were covered by the union shop clause in the contract, and
demanded that they be required to become members of the union
within ten days or be dismissed. The president replied to
the letter of the union and rejected the demands. The letter
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was immediately answered with a strike threat. The company was
informed that if the Moulders went out oh strike, the machinists
would not cross the picket lines. Paced with this threat, the
company acceeded to the demands of the union. The company
addressed letters to the employees involved, advising them to
join the Moulders Union by September 27th or be dismissed.
Pour of the men joined the Moulders Union, the other twenty
were dismissed. Thereupon a charge was filed with the National
Labor Relations Board, alleging that the discharges were unfair
labor practices.
Upon careful consideration of all the evidence, arguments
*nd briefs, the arbitrator arrived at the following decision:
1. The company shall immediately re-employ at their
formed jobs all the men discharged.
2. The company shall pay to each of such men re-
employed, a sum equal to two weeks pay.
3. The appropriate unit for collective bargaining,
represented by the Moulders Union, embraces the employees
discharged.
General Motors Corporation-Chevrolet Gear and Axle Case.
On August 7th, 1944, seven employees were discharged by
the Chevrolet Gear and Axle Division for participating in and
leading a work stoppage in violation of the agreement between
the General Motors Corporation and the United Automobile Workers
of America. Six of them filed identical grievances claiming
that their discharges were unjust, and that management had itself
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violated the agreement, and that they were entitled to rein-
statement and compensation for all time lost. The seventh
employee filed a grievance and stated, "I reported for work on
August 7th, 1S44 and management refused to allow me to resume
my job.”
During the spring of 1944 a dispute arose between management
and certain employees in Plant #3 concerning proper production
standards which should prevail in the Slot Gringing of Valve
Tappets, During the course of the dispute several grievances
were filed, the job was retimed, and management’s final answers
were received by the shop committee without appeal. Neverthe-
less a number of the employees apparently continued to assert
that the standards were reasonable and the failure of the
employees to meet them were deliberate.
On July 22nd, 1944, three employees were sent home for
producing less than the standard and told to return when they
were ready to produce a fair days work, A fourth employee was
sent hopie on July 24th under the same conditions, and a fifth
on July 26th, On the same day, two of those first sent home
reported back for work, but management considered their state-
ments as to their future intentions unsatisfactory, and sent
them home again.
On July 26th, apparently in protest, a number of employees
of Plant #3 left their jobs and refused to return. The stoppage
quickly spread. On July 27th all of Plant #3 was affected;
On July 28th Plant #6 went down.
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On July 31st all of the remaining plants were struck and
picket lines were formed in front of their entrances. On the
same day the Regional War Labor Board sent a telegram to the
Union directing the striking employees to return to their jobs
immediately. The strike nevertheless continued. Because of
their failure to terminate it, the officers of Local 235 were
suspended by the International Union and an administrator was
placed in charge of the union. Nevertheless, a mass meeting
was held on August 3rd and the employees voted to remain out
on strike until their grievances were settled and the discharged
employees put back to work and that none should be refused
reinstatement because of participation in the stoppage.
On the same day, the Regional War Labor Board directed
representatives of the Union to appear before it on August 3rd,
and show cause why the employees had not returned to work.
Representatives of management were likewise asked to attend.
At the hearing it developed that on the previous day the
Corporation had notified the Union that it intended to discharge
six of the seven employees involved--A, the President of the
Local Union, B, the shop committee foreman, C, a former shop
committee chairman, D, a former shop committeeman, E, another
shop committeeman, E and P were also former shop committeemen--
because of their efforts in leading and directing the stoppage.
The Board inquired into their status and found that they were
not yet discharged and were still employees.
While the parties were still at the hearing, the Board
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issued the following Directive Order:
1. The employees of the company are ordered back to
work immediately,
2. The representatives of the Company and the Union
are directed to do all in their power to further the resumption
of work and full production.
With regard to the six employees whose status was in
question, the chairman of the Board explained that "the return
to work of all employees means that the six men are to return
to work immediately,"
At a mass meeting held on August 6th, the striking employees
were informed of this Directive Order and of the assurance
that all employees without exception were to return to their
jobs. On that understanding, and in response to the pleas of
the International Union representatives, the employees voted
to return to work. They did so at the start of their various
shifts on August 7th. When the six employees named at the
hearing reported to the plant, however, they and one additional
employee-F. ; a district committeeman, were not allowed to
resume their jobs. Instead they were referred to the Personnel
office where they received three hours call in pay and formal
notice of their discharge.
When the employees learned of this, they again went on
strike. In an effort to secure termination of this new work
stoppage, the War Labor Board summoned the parties to another
hearing on August 7th and issued a new Directive Order. It

stated
The employees of the Company are ordered back to
work immediately. The International Officers, the Administra-
tor and the Local Union representatives are directed to use
their full authority of their offices to accomplish such return
to work.
The chairman of the War Labor Board explained that since
the six employees had now been discharged, the Order did not
require that they be taken back.
As it became apparent that despite this Order, production
would not be resumed, the War Labor Board, on August 10th,
held a hearing in Washington at which the entire question of
the status and disposition of the seven discharged employees
was discussed. Following that hearing the Board issued a
Directive Order, the first paragraph of which repeated verbatim
the language of the Regional Board's Order of August 8th, the
second paragraph of which read as follows:
"The seven employees who were discharged on Monday,
August 7th, 1944, are now not to be returned to work. Their
discharge grievance shall be considered by the Impartial
Umpire under the contract within five days after the resumption
of production."
Production was resumed on August 14th, 1944 and four days
later these grievances were heard by the umpire.
At the hearing before the umpire, the Union raised two
principle issues:
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1-
Whether or not the conduct of these seven employees in
connection with the first stoppage, considered alone, justified
their discharge
•
2-
Whether or not their discharge was improper in view of
the specific direction of the Regional War Labor Board that they
return to work.
Both parties conceeded that the first issue was properly
within the jurisdiction of the umpire. As to the second, the
union contended that it had been brought within his jurisdiction
by order of the National War Labor Board. It flatly asserted
that in an effort to end the stoppage and insure resumption of
production, the Regional Board, by its Order of August 4th, had
superseded the Agreement and deprived the Corporation of the
right to discharge any employees because of their participation
in a strike.
The Corporation vigorously disputed this contention. The
authority of the umpire stems entirely from the agreement. The
National War Labor Board did not abrogate the Agreement, or
vest in the umpire special arbitral powers, or designate him
individually as its agent to interpret and give effect to
the Orders of the Regional Board. It merely referred these
grievances to him for consideration "under the contract." By
so doing, the Corporation urged, it obviously contemplated
that the umpire would consider these cases in the same manner
that he consider grievances arising from the discharge of strike
leaders and that the sole issue before him would be whether or
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not the activities of the discharged employees were such as to
justify the penalty imposed*
On this question the umpire found himself in disagreement
with both parties. He found the union clearly wrong in its
belief that the Regional Board intend to supersede the agreement,
or that the National Labor Relations Board extended his juris-
diction beyond contractual limits. He found the Corporation
wrong in contending that merely because the umpire cannot
interpret or enforce it, the Order of the Regional Board has
no bearing on this case.
When an employee alleges that he was discharged or penalized
without good cause, he places at issue not only his own conduct,
but that of the employer as well. Present in every such case
is the question of whether or not the employer was exercising
his disciplinary function under the written agreement. It is
the duty of the umpire to ascertain just what the employee did
and what steps management took to warn and correct him. Also
how management treated other employees in similar circumstances
and was the attitude fair. In all cases where an umpire has
been called in to settle cases of discipline, he must decide
whether management's exercise of its right to discipline for
cause was proper and should be upheld.
The umpire in this case noted the factor which conclusively
distinguished the conduct of these employees from that of their
fellow workers was their position as union officials. The
gravity of their offense arose from their disregard of the
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obligations that union office brings. It is significant to
note that during the stoppage, the executive board of the
International Union saw fit to suspend these officers and place
an Administrator in charge of the Local.
The umpire has no authority over the internal affairs of
the union. His authority to set conditions upon the modifica-
tions of a penalty seems clear and has already been exercised.
Weighing all the circumstances, and balancing the offenses of
these employees against the misconduct of the Corporation, he
decided to rule as follows:
1. Upon conditions that employees A,B,C,D,E,F, resign
any office they hold in Local 235 and upon condition
that the Local and International agree with the
Corporation that they shall hold no office for a
period of one year from the date of their reinstate-
ment, their penalties shall be modified to show a
disciplinary lay-off of ten weeks. If these con-
ditions are fulfilled, they shall be reinstated to
their jobs on October 16, 1944 and their employment
records corrected accordingly. If these conditions
are not fulfilled, their discharges shall stand.
2. The case of the seventh employee was reinstatement
at ohce since his discharge was not proven.
3. The case is a violation of the agreement between
the Union and the Corporation and no back pay is
awarded.
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The Wright Aeronautical Corporation Case,
This dispute between the Wright Aeronautical Corporation
and the International Union, United Automobile Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 669, C,I,0,
grew out of the demand by the Union that the Company remove the
acting supervisor in one of its foundries, and the refusal of
the Company to do so. The demand for the removal of the super-
visor was based on various alleged grievances against him by
the employees, the claim that his conduct was destructive to
morale, that in dealing with employees, he was arrogant and
unreasonable, that through reprisals, actual and threatened, the
procedure for redressing grievances had been rendered ineffective,
that his management of the foundary had resulted in loss of
wages and work to the employees with consequent slowing down of
production and injury to the war effort. The Company denied
the truth of these charges and refused to remove the supervisor.
The failure of the company to remove the supervisor resulted
in a walkout by the employees, notwithstanding a provision in
the contract between the Company and the Union that any strike
would be a violation of the agreement.
After conferences with the Army, National War Labor Board,
the Company and the Union, the employees were persuaded to
return to work pending an arbitration of the issues involved.
It was agreed between the Company and the Union to submit two
questions to the arbitrator to be selected by the Chairman of
Region #2 of the National War Labor Board. The two questions
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submitted were:
1. Is the Unions demand for the removal of the
supervisor arbitrable ’(
2* Shall the Union’ 3 demand for the removal of A.L.
Knowles be granted?
In connection with the second question, it should be pointed
out that Mr. Knowles’ position with the Company is that of
Assistant Supervisor in one of the foundaries, that because of
the absence of the supervisor, due to illness, Mr. Knowles has
been acting supervisor in the foundary. Thus Mr. Knowles is
clearly a supervisory employee and therefore is not included
in the bargaining unit under the contract entered into between
the Company and the Union, dated October 21, 1943. The con-
tract expressly excluded supervisory personnel from the bargain-
ing unit*
At the outset it should be pointed out that the functions
and the powers of the arbitrator in this case are limited by
the specific issues submitted to him by the joint action of the
Company and the Union*
It is not the function of the arbitrator to decide how the
Company or the Union should conduct their affairs or discharge
the heavy responsibility which rests upon them to maintain plant
efficiency and maintain production at top speed. Both manage-
ment and production workers play an indispensible part in the
achievement of these ends. The functions they perform are
quite different and call for different skills. Interference
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of once with the functions of the other tend to impair and
even destroy plant efficiency* It is only through uninterrupted
cooperation that these ends can be fully attained*
Effective cooperation necessarily requires concessions at
times by both management and the workers. But this does not
mean that every demand must be granted* Peace bought by unwise
concessions may in the long run do more harm than good. There
is a difference between appeasement and cooperation. A failure
to recognize the distinction by those conducting an industrial
enterprise or a national may and has resulted in disaster. In
the case of industry, the responsibility for making decisions,
whether they be by management or by labor, must necessarily
rest upon those in charge. Authority to make particular
decisions may be delegated, but responsibility for the delega-
tion and its results must in the end rest with those who delegate.
An arbitrator, appointed by or with the consent of the
parties to a controversy, exercises a delegated authority. It
is neither his duty or privilege to do more than decide the
specific issues submitted to him.
Within the limits of the issues submitted to him, he may
exercise his own best judgement. He should bring to bear such
wisdom as he has in seeking the right answer to the question
asked. Beyond this he may not go.
Whatever may have been the intentions of the parties in
the case under consideration, they have not made a clean cut
submission of the merits of the controversy to arbitration.
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This they could have done by submitting the second question
alone. But they have submitted two, the answer to the first
conditions a consideration of the second. It is obvious that
if the first question is in the negative, a consideration of
the second question would be futile since the arbitrator
would be without power to resolve the issue.
At the hearing, which began in Paterson, N,J,, on Monday,
December 13, 1943, a counsel for the Company and the Union
confined their arguments to the first question. Upon completion
of the arguments, it was agreed to adjourn the hearing until
Wednesday, the 15th or December, 1943, in order to give the
arbitrator time to consider the arguments which had been made,
to study the contract between the Company and the Union, and
to examine various other cases and documents submitted by
the parties, with the hope that a decision might be reached
respecting the first question before the Company and the Union
were put to the expense of introducing evidence on the second
question.
During the evening of the 14th of December, the arbitrator
called the counsel for the Company and the Union into a
conference to amplify their contentions, and answer cases that
had been submitted to support their contion. At this time it
was agreed to extend the time of the consideration of the first
question until the morning of the 17th,
The question "Is the Union's demand for the removal of the
supervisor arbitrable?" taken literally and without reference
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to the circumstances which led to its submission, presents no
issue. The removal of the supervisor is arbitrable if manage-
ment and labor agree unconditionally to submit the question of
removal to arbitration. The question presents an issue only if
one of the parties, in this case the company, has not agreed
to submit the question unconditionally. Therefore the first
question must be interpreted to mean can the question be settled
by arbitration without the unconditional consent of the company K
It was argued that unless the grievance procedure was
interpreted to permit the arbitration of the removal of the
supervisor, the workers have no adequate remedy in the present
case as it is claimed that an intolerable situation has devel-
oped which can be cured only by the removal. It was contended
that under war conditions, the employee is not free to leave
his job and seek employment elsewhere without a release from
the company, and therefore the grievance procedure should be
interpreted as to permit the removal, through arbitration,
of a supervisor who is intolerable to the employees.
If a grievance procedure provided in a contract is ineffect-
ive in curing the situation, then that is a defect in the
contract. It would be highly improper for the arbitrator to
distort the terms upon appeal of either party so long as the
contract stands.
If the process of collective bargaining is to survive as
a method of adjusting industrial disputes and conflicting
interests of employer and employee, both parties to the contracts
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that are made must respect and abide by their terms*
It was contended by counsel for the Union that even should
it be held that the removal of a supervisory employee is not
arbitrable under the contract, it should be held to be arbi-
trable as a matter of policy independent of the contract in
view of the emergency that has arisen in the Wright Plant, the
uninterrupted operation of which is essential to meet the needs
of the armed forces* The importance of the smooth operation
of the Wright plant to the war effort is a fact which the
Company should remember in deciding whether it is sound policy
to keep a supervisor in a job when he is having difficulty in
handling the employees*
It is also a fact that employees should consider before
they walk off a plant, when no strike had been called by their
union, due to the presence of a supervisor they do not like*
The irritation caused by an unfair or unreasonable supervisor
is a trivial grievance when compared to the irritation which
soldiers must bear when needed supplies do not arrive.
The Wright Corporation refused to arbitrate the second
question unconditionally, and the arbitrator ruled in the
negative on the first.
The National Labor Relations Board ordered the union to
direct its members to return to their jobs. This was done and
the plant resumed full scale operations*
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Great Lakes Steel Corporation Case*
This case grew out of the discharge of an employee who was
alleged to have been guilty of slow down and work stoppage
activities. The case was submitted to the Department of Labor
for settlement and an impartial umpire was appointed to hear
the facts and decide the issue. The question to be passed on
by the arbitrator was: Whether or not the discharge of Anthony
Rienhart was justified? If not, whether back pay should be
allowed? If so, how much?
A hearing attended by both parties was held in Detroit,
Michigan on March 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19 and 20, 1942 at which
time evidence was presented and testimony given*
The company contends that Anthony Rienhart was discharged
on January 29, 1942, because a stoppage of work in the No* 2
Strip Finish Department on January 23, 1942, and because of
Mr. Rienhart being responsible for or taking part in the
controlled lower production of the department.
The Union contended that the discharge of Anthony Rienhart
was unjustified and that he was discharged because of his union
activities*
The company offered evidence which it contended proved that
Anthony Rienhart was responsible for the work stoppage and
responsible for the controlled lowered production of the
Finish Department*
The union offered evidence which it contended showed that
there was no justification for the discharge and that Mr*
. d, o .’O.' " . ... c
<3 .1 d i ri r
_
n-t o t b - il ' e si . ‘oo •
‘1 :
’
*
i: j- -.in. : ±.‘i *. • !; .vs '• ! J :
'
.
,
«
• »
,
:t . ad io o‘i Ccf ^nc 1 • i . . . • '• . .»
.
diarfj ih ^nc. 'JaA o z- -a 1 :• A ' bobaad *oo r- irrj A
/ . i •'
i
. iq >e >o dl rfo.Li j>r- Iv ' 0
j 1 C Cd. ... : • • ' j-iBlf.i r.
erld ‘ 7 i oufjoiq bsikurol beXIo-, i.. :rid aol >Xdlsnoq^ :.i
.
•ir’
"
•
- oi \
.
•!
Rienhart was doing everything he could to increase production*
During the course of the testimony, it was revealed by
certain employees that Mr. Rienhart gave orders and did certain
things that limited production. Yet he denied these allegations
and pointed out that he made speeches at various union meetings
to men who were out on strike to return to work.
The arbitrator in questioning Mr. Rienhart found that he
had falsified his place of birth and previous employment. This
knowledge forced the arbitrator to place little credence in
the statements of the discharged employee, and he held that
the discharge of Mr. Rienhart was justified,
b. Government Intervention:
The question of relationships between strong organizations
of employers and employees and industrial peace is of importance
since it appears that intervention of governmental agencies in
the adjustment of labor disputes has a long run effect on
strengthening the union organization. To a much lesser degree,
such governmental intervention may even result in strengthening
the hand of isolated individual employers.
The intervention of governmental agencies in specific
labor disputes usually strengthens the weaker party. Prior to
such intervention, the stronger party had nothing to mediate
or nothing to arbitrate. However, when a government agency
enters the picture, both parties feel that it is necessary to
appear reasonable and cooperative. The stronger party may find
that it may be unwise to press an unreasonable point of view
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before an adjustment agency, even though the party has the
economic power to enforce its demands. This is particularly
true when a public report may be made on the dispute.
Unions have, historically speaking, been the weaker party,
and it is interesting to note that unions have in the past
requested mediation much more frequently than have employers.
Likewise in the past, unions have accepted arbitration with
more alacrity than have employers. Arbitration and mediation
offer the weaker party the possibility for securing some con-
cessions which could not be secured solely through economic
power.
The former National Defense Mediation Board and the present
War Labor Board have frequently awarded responsible unions a
maintenance of membership provision, and this certainly
strenghtens these unions at a time when the no strike pledge
might otherwise result in seriously undermining union organiza-
tion. Unionism in the railroad industry had increased in
strength since the Railway Labor Act of 1926.
Employees are more apt to meet with and to negotiate with
union representatives under the auspices of a mediation agency
than otherwise.
Most mediation agencies attempt to secure written agreements
this being an advantage to the union.
These and still other factors suggest that governmentel
intervention in the adjustment of labor disputes had a long run
effect on strengthening union organization and even in some
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cases employers. This of course. If not the purpose of Inter-
vention but merely an Inevitable by product. Under these
circumstances, it is pertinent to inquire whether strong union
organizations of employers and employees are conducive to
industrial peace.
The view is frequently expressed that "the frequency of
strikes varies inversely with the strength of the union."
This view is held to be typical by some labor leaders and labor
authorities. Samu&l Gompers expressed it very well when he
said, "As a consistent opponent of strikes, though I do find
that those organizations of labor which have best provided
themselves with the means to strike have continually less
occasions to indulge in them. The most potent factor to pre-
vent or reduce the number of strikes is a well organized trade
union with a full treasury ready to strike should the necessity
arise. In fact, the number and extent of strikes can be
accurately gauged by the extent, power and financial resources
of an organization in any trade or calling. The barometer of
strikes rises with lack of, or weakness in, organization, and
diminishes with the extent and power of the trade union
movement."
This view is supported by the record in some industries
and is opposed by the record in other industries. Thus, grow-
ing union organization seems to have been associated with a
decline in strikes in the following industries: daily news-
papers, men’ s alothing Industry, railroads and glass. However,
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increasing trade union strength has not been associated with
any marked trend toward industrial peace in the building trades
industry or in the bituminous coal industry.
Some authorities on labor problems hold to the theory that
strikes tend to increase with increasing union strength. John
Griffen, after making a statistical analysis of the relationship
between unionization and strikes has concluded that the growth
of unionization had been accompanied by the increase, or at
least the continuance of industrial disputes. Dr. Paul Douglas
also made a detailed statistical investigation as with respect
to the relationship between unionization and strikes and con-
cluded that union members were from 15 to 38 times as apt to
strike as non-union members in the period 1821 to 1921.
Statistical studies such as those of Griffin and Douglas
fail to prove that increasing union strength leads to any more
strikes. Strikes are influenced by many more variables which
do not readily lead themselves to accurate and meaningful
statistical analysis. It is of course probably true that a
union member is more apt to be involved in a strike than a
nonunion member, but that is not the real question. The question
involves the relative frequency of strikes as between a strong
union and a weak union, not as between a union and a non-
union. On this point available statistical analysis is not
conclusive.
There has been still another point of view which has
commanded much support for many years. This is that a strong
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organization by one of the parties does not lead to any apprec-
iable lessening of industrial conflict but that the minimum
possibilities of industrial peace will be realized only when
there are strong organizations of both employers and employees*
This view was strongly expressed by E* Dana Durand, Sec-
retary of the United States Industrial Commission, as early
as 1900.
The report of the President's Commission which investigated
industrial relations in Great Britain in 1938 supports the
contention that strong organizations of both employer and
employees are conducive to lasting industrial peace. The
Commission stated:
"Repeatedly employers and the representatives of employers'
organizations stated to us that they preferred strong unions
to veak ones, because the strong unions are better able to
secure the fulfilment of the contract and is better able to
bring competitors up to the wage and hour standards of the
industry, as set by the agreements. Repeatedly labor represent-
atives stated to us that they preferred strong employer organ-
izations to weak ones, because the stronger the organizations
the fewer the units which remain outside to undermine industry
standards. We can, however, state with certainty, that in
those industries where collective bargaining between national
unions and national associations of employers have been long
established, strikes have been rare, and in many instances
non-existent since the very beginning of the collective
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bargaining arrangements.”
"Recently Morris Llewellyn Cooke and William H. Davis
have strongly urged the creation of industry-wide employers*
associations for the purpose of bargaining collectively with
the organizations of employees."
It is impossible to prove conclusively that strong organiza-
tions of both employers and employees will operate to lessen
the number of strikes. However, it seems possible that strong
organizations on both sides would mean fewer strikes, but that
the strikes that did occur would be more serious. To meet
these occasional crises, something similar to the emergency
boards in the railroad industry would probably have to be
created on the federal level.
The problem of conflicting jurisdictions between adjustment
agencies is of vital importance, since the introduction of a
number of persons from different agencies into an individual
dispute generally results in confusion and delay. Both parties
go from one mediator to another, sometimes telling conflicting
stories, playing one mediator against the other, and attempting
to utilize one mediator against the other as bargaining
ins truments.
Information is readily available on cases where as many
as five distinct interests were attempting to mediate a
dispute. In the Vultee strike, three federal agencies attempted
to mediate the dispute. In the recent Allis-Chalmers dispute,
four different federal agencies intervened and the state board
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offerred its mediation services. Many other similar instances
have occurred.
The problem of jurisdiction is a difficult one. With
respect to the overlapping authority of the federal agencies,
these conclusions seem sounds
1. Where a federal special adjustment agency has been
created for a specific industry, such agency should have
exclusive jurisdiction.
2. Apart from such special agencies, one federal agency
should be given exclusive jurisdiction, and no other federal
agency should be allowed to offer its services or permit its
services to be utilized in mediation except upon the specific
request of the agency having exclusive jurisdiction.
These recommendations will not, however, meet the problem
of conflicts between the federal and state agencies. It is
probable that the federal agency could not legally prohibit
state agencies from attempting mediation in disputes occurring
within state boundaries. Moreover, such an arrangement would
be of questionable wisdom. The only satisfactory arrangement
seems to be mutual agreement between federal and state agencies
in individual states specifying that each agency shall give
notice to the other at the moment it intervenes in a particular
dispute. Satisfactory arrangements are possible if the
respective agencies sincerely desire them.
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IV. Arbitration#
It is the prevailing view that disputes of all kinds except-
ing those involving criminal questions may properly be submitted
to arbitration. Both questions of law and fact may be arbi-
trated and it is not required that the subject matter be one
on which a suit might be brought in the courts.
The breadth of the arbitrational field is not restricted by
the arbitrary classifications of law. Torts, contracts and
property questions, including future as well as past damages,
may be submitted for an award. Even rights in land may be
submitted to arbitration and the final award becomes binding
on both parties despite the fact that the arbitrator could not
pass upon the title.
With this great breadth of action open to arbitration it is
not surprising that the scope of its use has been equally broad
in recent years. The motion picture industry has found it
particularly effective because of its speed and flexibility in
the matter of adjusting disputes of all kinds.
In the United States there exists several thousand commer-
cial and trading associations. Hundreds of these have made
their own rules on arbitration. They have made a notable
contribution toward maintaining good relations among their mem-
bers who have been parties to disputes. In the field of foreign
trade, many parties have discovered that arbitration operates
much more effectively and quickly than the courts of any
country having possible jurisdiction of the disputes.
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No field c$ human endeavor in recent years has employed
arbitration more extensively than labor and industry in attempt-
ing to settle labor disputes.
The following table of figures complied by the United
States Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor indicate
the number of cases in which arbitrators were appointed by that
division, to bring about a settlement of labor disputes.
1959-1940 175
1940-
1941 229
1941-
1942- —656
1942-
1943 1475
1943-
1944 1444
Prom these figures it can be readily ascertained that the
curve of arbitration is steadily rising and also points to the
fact the increasing role government has played and will continue
to play in maintaining industrial peace.
National Labor Relations Act.
In a series of five decisions on April 12, 1937, the United
States Supreme Court established the constitutionality of the
National Labor Relations Act passed in 1935. The Court affirmed
that Congress under its powers to regulate commerce amoncf the
states, has the authority to protect the collective bargaining
rights of the workers whose businesses are substantially
interstate in character.
The National Labor Relations Act declared it to be the
policy of the United States to prevent and mitigate labor
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disputes, by encouraging the practice and procedure of collect-
ive bargaining and by protecting the exercise of the workers
of full freedom of association, self organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of their own choosing. For many years
before this statute was enacted there had been a recognition
of the evils of constant industrial strife and the magnitude
of its effect on the commerce of the nation. During certain
periods of readjustment the evil became more pronounced, the
controversies more numerous and more apt to spread, through
sympathetic action, to other enterprises in the industry Or to
other industries.
The National Labor Relations Board gets jurisdiction over
a case when a charge is made by a union representative or an
employee, that an employer has engaged in or is engaging in
unfair practice. As the Act now stands, this is the privilege
of the employee. Then the Board or any of its agents is
authorized to serve a complaint against such a person, and a
hearing is held and a finding of fact is made as to whether
the defendent is or has been guilty of any of the five unfair
practices listed in the Labor Relations Act. Jurisdiction is
limited to the investigation of questions affecting commerce,
interstate and foreign. The practices that are declared unfair
for employers are:
1. To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise, of their right guaranteed by the law to organise
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their
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2. To dominate or to interfere with any labor organi-
zation or to contribute financially or to otherwise to its
support.
3* By discrimination in hiring or employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
4. To discharge or otherwise discriminate against any
employee who files charges or gives testimony under the Act.
5. To refuse to bargain collectively with representa-
tives of employees as provided in the Act.
No penalties are provided for non-compliance with the Board’s
orders, or for refusal to testify or to produce records or to
answer subpoenas. The Board is authorized to petition federal
circuit courts of appeals for decree to enforce its orders,
and these courts may then punish for contempt.
The Remington Rand Case:
One of the bitterest labor disputes of recent years was
carried to the Supreme Court by the Remington Rand, Inc.,
which contested the validity of the orders of the National
Labor Relations Board. The Company asked the Court to review
a decree of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals compelling the
company to comply, with minor modifications, with a cease and
desist order issued by the Board.
The Board’s order, outgrowth of strikes in the Remington
Rand plants in the spring of 1936, directed the company to offer
reinstatement to employees who went out on strike and allegedly
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were barred from reinstatement. The company's petition said
the number might run as high as 4,000.
The company charged that the Circuit Court should have
nullified the Board's order because misconduct by union members
during the strike had barred them from aid. "To say that a
union guilty of misconduct may compel the employer to bargain
with it, and to say that members of the union, who were guilty
of crimes committed subsequent to the date of the strike, are
entitled to reinstatement, is to encourage industrial strife
rather than to eliminate the cause of it."
The company specifically challenged the Board's findings
that the Remington Rand Joint Protective Board of the District
Council of Office Equipment Workers, a unit of the Metal Trades
Department of the American Federation of Labor, represented
a majority of the workers at the six plants involved.
The Board directed the company to recognize the Protective
Board as bargaining agency and to bargain with it for workers
at the plants in Tonawanda, Ilion, Syracuse, N.Y.; Middleton,
Conn.; Marietta and Norwood, Ohio.
The Remington Rand petition asserted that the Board had
gone far beyond its legal powers in ordering the reinstatements
and pointed out that in each instance where former employees
accepted reinstatement, a present employee whould have to be
discharged. Therefore, the petition concluded, as many as
4,000 current workers would face the loss of their jobs.
Remington Rand lost the case and the process of reinstate-
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ment of discharged employees began on July 28th, 1938. All
but some 200 who wanted to go back to their old jobs had been
reinstated.
The Wagner Act:
The Wagner Act recognizes the interests of the public,
labor and industry. It seeks to relieve the public of costly
labor disturbances through eliminating the deep-rooted unrest
brought on by employers, who are determined to defeat the
organizations of their workers. In labor' 3 behalf it seeks
to make it unnecessary for workers to undergo the hardships
and dangers of strikes in support of a right recognized for
decades by the courts, by party platforms and by legislators
and legislatures. The prohibition of unfair labor practices
imposes no undue hardships on violations, and to industries
voluntarily complying with the law it affords protection
against sweat shop tactics of unscrupulous competitors.
The Social Security Act.
The Federal Social Security Act was approved on August 14,
1935. This measure, providing among other things, the beginning
of a nation-wide system of unemployment insurance, attempts
to offset many of the hardships a worker may experience by
finding himself unemployed through no fault of his own.
Railway Labor Act.
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 stated explicitly that railway
workers should be free to choose their own representatives for
purposes of collective bargaining. After making it the mutual
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duty of the carriers and their employees to exert every reason-
able effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates
of pay, rules and working conditions, the Act provides:
"Representatives, for the purpose of this Act, shall be desig-
nated by the respective parties in such a manner as may be
provided for in their corporate organization or unincorporated
association or by any other means of collective action, without
interference, influence or coercion exercised by either party
over the self-organization or designation of representatives
except by designated authority."
The importance of the above provision was to encourage
bona fide labor organizations. In 1930 the United States
Supreme Court held this provision constitutional, but on the
basis of it upheld an order of the federal district court,
directing the disbanding of a company union by the Texas and
New Orleans Railroad among its shop employees. After '-this
decision by the federal courts it became certain under the
Railway Labor Act of 1926 company unions and yellow dog
contracts could no longer be used to dominate labor organizations.
Thus it can be readily seen that the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act, (the Wagner kct) the Social Security Act,
and the Railway Labor Act, laid the foundation for the process
of arbitration under government supervision. Most authorities
of the subject of labor, agree that the enactment of these laws
by the Congress has done more to stabilize the labor situation
than any similar attempts. That these laws are but a forerunner
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of subsequent government regulation of labor and industry, only
the ill-informed can doubt* If the United States is to
experience the ideal in social-labor and industrial relations,
then government must, in order to protect the well being of the
entire nation, take a positive and uncompromising stand, in
order to eliminate industrial strife. Too long has the govern-
ment allowed industry and labor to settle their disputes on
the basis of a pitched battle. Arbitration, and all that it
implies, seems to be the avenue of escape from the economic
and personal loss entailed by industrial disputes. The paternal
attitude of government has been assailed by many free thihkers
and pseudo- economists, in matters concerning labor and
industry. They claim that in the economy that has made this
country great, the less government infringes in matters concern-
ing labor and industry, the better it will be for the country
and the citizens. Such an attitude is fallacious and can only
lead to disaster. Industry and labor must recognize the rights
and the duties of each other, and cooperating with each other
under government regulation, not supervision, can lead to a
better life for all#
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V.Weakness of Collective Bargaining.
a. Jurisdictional disputes:
One serious problem confronting orderly col-
.ective bargaining grows out of dissension in the organized labor
i lovement-out of jurisdictional disputes, of rival unions in the
l3ame field and of personal animosities which are either causes or
results the foregoing. The term" jurisdictional dispute" is now pop
alarly accepted as a disagreement between unions over the right
>f one or the other to represent a particular group of employees,
>r over which union is to control certain work.
Such disputes have long plagued organized
Labor. They are more frequent among craft than indistrial unions.
Decause changes in occupation, new materials , and new production
nethods which may require retaining or regrouping of skills, and
jiew industries create situations where craft jurisdictions con-
flict.
b. bn«$en Growth of Collective bargaining.
The entire history of collective bargaining
las been marked by uneven, ragged development , differing in various
Industries and periods and places .There is no uniform pattern dis
cernible either in the past or the present. Such a beginning and
listory points to an inhearent weakness in the plan and policy of
collective bargaining.
c. Lack of policing.
There are few legal precedents for policing
a collective agreement . Its success or failure depends upon the
nutual trust, good will and intelligence with which management and
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unions can surround a controversial point. To apply collective
bargaining competently, or to use it even reasonably well,requir
es hard work;and like most hard work, it is easier to evade than
to carry out.
d. Lack of Guiding Precepts.
Among our more mature labor and employ
er groups, few guiding preecpts are to be found. Collective bar-
gaining too often becomes a compromise based upon approximation
and financial power of the two parties rather than upon scien-
tific verifiable evidence. This conditions only lends to continu
ed bitterness and distrust by the parties in a labor dispute.
e. Collective versus Individual bargaining.
The fact that less than one third of
the total working force in the United States is unionized is of
ten cited to prove the individual bargain superior to the col-
lective bargain. Advocates of this view affirm that the relati-
vely small percentage of laborers in union organizations sug-
gests that employers can be counted on to give the worker a fair
deal. To be sure, some employers, on the basis of the individual
bargain, provide wage standards that equal, and even surpass , those
in unioized establishments .This is one of the most controversial
topics in collective bargaining and much can be said for both
sides of the question. ^ome students of collective bargaining con
sider this topic one of the weakness of the baggaining policy, p
f. Lack of Knowledge by public.
During the war, the intervention of gov-
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ofeminent in settling industrial disputes tended to bring the idea
of collective bargaining to the attention of the general public.
It is important for the citizens to have an understanding of
the critical importance of stable and harmonious industrial re-
lations and this can be accomplished by a complete understand-
ing of the part collective bargaining plays in any industrial
dispute
.

V. Improvement in Collective Bargaining,
Those who advocate arbitration sometimes talk as though
the workers have in them some perverse streak which makes them
want to strike. They have no understanding of the low wages,
long hours, speed-up, the discrimination, and the petty tyrannies
that drive workers to desperation. Nor do they understand that
workers usually strike as a last resort in order to obtain an
income, and that income is interrupted by a strike. To a
youth, tire of drab factory life, a strike may bring a touch
of adventure and excitement but a worker with family responsi-
bilities is sobered by the thought of mounting debts. It is
no fun to pound the pavements for hours in a picket line, in
rain or snow. It is not pleasant to be charged by mounted
police, or slugged by hired hoodlums, or be the target for
tear gas bombs. Workers strike because they have grievances
beside which these terrors are as nothing, and because they
have learned by long experience that only a militant union,
able and willing to strike when that becomes necessary, can
wrest concessions from powerful employers.
But why not arbitrate, and save the loss to employer,
suffering to the strikers, and the inconvenience to every one
else? When unions are powerful and well established, arbitra-
tion has and can prove satisfactory. In certain American
industries collective bargaining and arbitration have proven
highly satisfactory over a period of many years. The men’s
clothing industry is perhaps the shining example of this content:
't<
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Often supposed impartial arbitrators revealed themselves
as men with the employers point of view and thus make the
workers suspicious of the value of arbitration. Yet workers
both in the United States and Great Britain, have called for
arbitration many more times than employers, because workers
have been usually in the weaker position, and it is the weak
who are most eager to arbitrate. For arbitration usually
insures some sort of compromise, whereas in battle the weaker
party may expect complete defeat.
.,
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VII .Conclusion.
This review of efforts to maintain industrial peace
demonstrates that collective bargaining and arbitration are, and
can be effective means in shaping the industrial welfare of the
United States. The part of wisdom is to attempt, not to outlaw
strikes, but instead remove the just grievances of the workers
which are the primary causes of strikes. If that is done, if em-
ployers are forced to bargain collectively, to establish proper
working conditions , and pay adequate wages , relatively few strikes
will occur. The longest and most severe strikes have occurred,
not where labor was powerfully organized and management willing
to deal with it, but where the right to organize was not granted
and genuine collective bargaining was denied.lt is where unions
are weak, not where they are strong, that strikes are to be most
expected.
No responsible labor leader will sanction a strike if
continued negotiations offer promise of a satisfactory agreement
Where outlaw strikes have occurred it was usually due to the un-
fair practices on the part of the employer and inexperience on
the part of the workers and their leaders.
The United States is making steady progress now with
the National Labor delations Act, but this law needs some revisi-
on in order to make its application more just for all concerned.
Under its existing provisions , labor has the upper hand and man-
agement is placed in a disadvantageous position. If wage boards
fix minimum rates for the so-called sweat Indus tries , and the Nat-
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ional Labor Relations Act protects the right of the workers to
organize and bargain collectively, relatively few strikes need
occur .Conciliation service should be continued and voluntary ar-
bitration encouraged. If , despite this progress , compulsory arbitral-
tion is attempted, industrial relations would be embittered, and a
discouraging situation would likely follow. Along the path of vol-
untary collective bargaining lies the greatest hope of satisfac-
tory and peaceful industrial relations.
The following outline for effective settlement of dis-
putes seems to the writer to include all the essentials for good
j
collective bargaining:
1. Sincerity of intentions to truly bargain collec
tively.If management, especially, looks at the bargaining process
largely in terms of what it can force down the other fellow’s
throat and squeeze out of him, then the process certainly is not
going to work.
2.
An honest expression of facts • Generally speak-
ing, both sides set up a great many issues or over state their
case to create a ’’bargaining reserve”upon which they can give in
if necessary. So frequently, the issues as they come into being, are
far from what each side wants and is willing to give. Labor must
be willing to support its demands, and management its demands , with
an honest and genuine supply of facts.
3.
Responsibility by both parties. A contract means
little If not entered into by persons who intend to be responsi-
ble for their bargain. Furthermore, in the actual negotiation it-
self, it is most necessary that responsible top executives parti-
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cipate.In addition, it is most essential that both Management and
Labor begin to think more clearly about their individual respon-
sibilities to each other and not merely their"rights .
"
4. Continuous relationship between union and company of-
ficials* Good collective bargaining means more than negotiating
contracts .Where company and union officials maintain continuous
day to day relationships „and work with each other to make for
good industrial relations you will generally find t^e negotia-
tion of contracts and the whole collective bargaining process is
far more effective than where top executives only meet the pro-
blem on a crisis or negotiation basis.
5*Better understanding of the companies policies and
problems by union leaders .Management is frequently reluctant to
bring the union official closer to the company so that he can
understand their problems.Yet where this can and is done the
tendency is for the union official to have a great partnership
attitude. Too frequently the only time the union official gets
to know some of the problems is over the negotiation table.
6.
Knowledge of facts. This is an outgrowth of item#5,
and means that both the union and the company should be more o
open with each other in furnishing each other v/ith information
and facts. not just during negotiation but continuously.
7.
Proper attitude by both management and labor.lt
would be ideal if both parties could have an open minded attitu-
de of cooperation and not merely think of the other fellow as
someone who is tryjng to trespass on his rights.We can't expect
that labor and management will develop the attitude of "sweet-
v^oslloo lx. .el trio
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ness and honey” toward each other, but neither do we want a con-
tinuous attitude of distrust and even hatred.
8.
Properly educated foremen and supervisors and shop
stewards
•
9.
Adequate presentation of the case. So frequently du-
ring negoiations either the labor or management side is so poor-
ly presented that the best bargaining is impossible. This holds
true for the presentation of cases before arbitration boards and
governmental agencies .Management is probably more guilty than la
bor.The plant superintendent, personnel man may understand facts
very well, but may not be good negotiators .Much of the success of
negotiation and arbitration depends upon effective presentation
of the case and not just the facts involved.
10.
Absense of a govermental agency to settle issues. So
long as there is a governmental agency with authority to deter-
mine issues, both sides will tend to point thfe&r case toward this
agency and not to engage in honest responsible collective bar-
gaining.
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